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Persistence of scepticism in media reporting on climate change: the case of British 
newspapers 
Abstract 
This paper explores the persistence of scepticism in British newspapers’ narratives around 
climate change. It is based on 958 news articles collected over three decades (1988-2016) from 
nine newspapers. The analysis of “general consensus” around climate change and the 
consensus around both its causes and consequences, shows that scepticism is still present in 
newspapers’ narratives especially in relation to centre-right political orientations. The 
increasing consensus around both the causes and consequences does not necessarily mean that 
scepticism has disappeared, but it raises further questions around the modalities through which 
consequences, and actions to limit their impact, are represented.  





This paper investigates the persistence of scepticism in media reporting on climate change and 
if this can be explained by the political orientation of the media. The originality of this work 
relies on empirically exploring British newspaper reporting from 1988 to 2016 to observe 
potential changes in scepticism over time, especially in relation to both the attribution of causes 
and the evaluation of consequences. In fact, some studies highlighted that the journalistic norm 
of “balance” was no longer applied in climate change reporting given the prevalence of 
scientific consensus, nevertheless, this might not necessarily correspond to a reconciliation 
between “sceptics” and “advocates”. Therefore, the research question guiding this work 
investigates potential shifts from questioning the causes towards other aspects of climate 
change. The focus on British newspapers relates to the primary role played by Britain in the 
international politics of climate change and how its news articles are reproduced internationally 
(Painter and Gavin, 2015). Even though the UK newspaper industry has been challenged by 
changes in news production such as, for example, a migration of readers to online platforms, it 
is of a significant size. A report published by Mediatique (2018) shows that both print and 
online UK newspapers still shape the public debate and policy agenda by reaching most of the 
UK population. In fact, in 2017, 90% of adults in Great Britain consumed a news brand: 60% 
read a print newspaper and 75% an online newspaper (NRS, 2017). Even though online 
platforms have become an interest of social research, they have been mainly used to analyse 
public understanding of climate science (Koteyko, Nerlich and Hellsten, 2015; Leas et al., 
2016). On the one hand, they provide information about users’ perspectives (including non-
experts’ points of view, Author, 2018); on the other hand, online debates/web searches that are 
related to polarised issues, such as climate change (Cody et al., 2015; Pearce et al., 2014; 
Williams et al., 2015), might reinforce users’ existing biases as they are ideologically driven 
(Koutra, Bennett and Horvitz, 2015) and influenced by processes of content personalisation 
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(Liu and Weber, 2014). This might also be valid for newspaper consumers who tend to read 
newspapers that are in line with their pre-existing values (Feldman et al., 2014). However, UK 
newspapers were found to represent a plurality of points of view even if, as in the case of 
climate change, they represent a minority (Boykoff and Mansfield, 2008; Painter and Gavin, 
2015). Moreover, throughout the period considered in the present study, research into social 
media revealed that online debates tended to reproduce traditional media discourse (Veltri & 
Atanasova, 2015), and that web searches were influenced by information already reported by 
the traditional media (Gavin, 2010; Gavin & Marshall, 2011; Kirilenko and Stepchenkova, 
2014; Lineman et al., 2015). Furthermore, climate experts appeared to be less involved in 
disseminating information online (Schafer, 2012). Moreover, despite some successful 
mobilisation campaigns on social media, climate change organisations tended to consider their 
online communication successful if they attracted news media attention (Schafer, 2012). 
Finally, some events (e.g. the Climategate scandal related to the release of emails hacked from 
the University of East Anglia) show that debates which originated online were reproduced by 
print media. This further supports that the newspapers are more comprehensive in terms of both 
reporting existing online discourse and introducing issues/content to the public agenda 
(Hellsten & Vasileiadou, 2015). Therefore, given the existing interconnections between 
traditional and new media, and the relevant role played by both print and online newspapers in 
informing public opinion around climate change, the investigation of newspapers’ content is 
valuable in understanding their contribution to public knowledge about the phenomenon. 
The first section of this article reviews the literature on media polarisation around climate 
change. The second section and its related sub-section introduce the methods used for analysing 
British newspapers. The fourth section and its related sub-sections report the results of three 
regression analyses aimed at exploring changes in media reporting across three time-blocs, also 
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considering the political orientation of newspapers. Finally, some considerations and 
conclusions are drawn. 
Study background 
One recurrent theme in the debate on news media reporting on climate change is the conflict 
between “contrarians” and “advocates”, especially in both the USA and the UK (McKnight, 
2010; Painter and Ashe, 2012; Painter and Gavin, 2015). The cause of this polarisation is 
mainly attributed to the space given by the media to contrarian voices even though they 
represent a minority (Akerlof et al., 2012; Boykoff, 2013; Freudenburg and Muselli, 2010; 
Rahmstorf, 2012) in comparison to mainstream scientists (Boykoff and Boykoff, 2004; Moser 
and Dilling, 2004; Tosse, 2013).  
When the climate change debate started in 1988, the UK press represented the phenomenon as 
a multidimensional and collective problem caused by both humans and natural processes. Then, 
the media representation of climate change shifted towards the uncertainty around both causes 
and effects (Nerlich and Jaspal, 2014). According to Carvalho (2005, 2007), the increasing 
politicisation of climate change led conservative narratives to defend government interests, and 
the progressive ones to oppose government proposals. In contrast, the study conducted by 
Matthews (2015) between 2000 and 2010 found that the UK press represented climate change 
as a process in action with tangible effects and future risks/threats. The multiplicity of studies 
devoted to analysing “conflict frames” adopted by the media produced controversial results. 
Some studies found that the journalistic principle of “balance” in climate change reporting was 
a peculiarity of a starting phase (Boykoff and Boykoff 2004), which almost disappeared over 
time in both the US and the UK (Boykoff, 2007). However, a study of four UK tabloids between 
2000 and 2006 (Boykoff and Mansfield, 2008) showed that the balance norm was still 
characteristic of tabloid reporting. Moreover, Painter and Gavin (2015) showed a larger 
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representation of sceptical sources in the English context, compared to that reported by Boykoff 
(2007). Other studies showed that UK newspapers have progressively embraced consensus 
focusing on “action frames” (Grundmann and Krishnamurthy, 2010; Nerlich, Forsyth and 
Clarke, 2012). This controversy might be attributed to coding divergences. For example, Rice, 
Gustafson and Hoffman (2018) suggest that in some cases the "conflict frame" is strictly 
defined as a division between "supporters" and "deniers" (Takahashi et al., 2017), whereas in 
other cases, uncertainty and controversy are used as synonyms (Kuha, 2009; Zehr, 2000). 
However, these contradictory results might be explained by a shift (Hiles and Hinnant, 2014) 
from reporting disagreement around the causes towards the consequences of climate change 
and the related intervention needed. Given these premises, the general research question related 
to potential changes in sceptical narratives of climate change, was articulated into three sub-
questions: 
Has the overall scientific consensus around climate change increased over time?  
This RQ is motivated by those findings that show that the balance norm is no longer prevalent 
in the context of climate change, because newspapers have embraced scientific consensus 
(Boykoff, 2007; Boykoff and Boykoff, 2004). However, these studies mainly focus on the 
existence/causes of climate change. This might indicate that the consensus around the 
anthropogenic nature of climate change has increased, but also that scepticism might have 
started to bring into question other aspects of climate change. This point is connected to the 
second RQ: 
Is the representation of scientific consensus related to the anthropogenic nature of climate 
change? 
This RQ explores potential explanations for previous findings related to the increasing 
consensus around climate change. However, several studies (Boykoff and Mansfield, 2008; 
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Carvalho, 2005, 2007; Painter and Gavin, 2015) also attributed the differences in media 
reporting to the partisan nature of climate change and the political orientation of newspapers 
(Antilla, 2005; Dirikx and Gelders, 2010; Schmidt and Schäfer, 2015).  
This supports the third RQ that investigates potential new trajectories of climate change 
scepticism in relation to the political orientation of newspapers: 
Have centre-right newspapers shifted towards questioning the consequences of climate 
change? 
This RQ is motivated by recent studies that found new expressions of scepticism in newspaper 
reporting related to the impact of climate change, which, if real, might be beneficial (Painter 
and Ashe, 2012; Painter and Gavin, 2015). This shift might explain an increase of overall 
scientific consensus in news reporting over time as suggested by some studies (Grundmann 
and Krishnamurthy, 2010; Nerlich, Forsyth and Clarke, 2012). In fact, the simultaneous 
increase in adopting scientific consensus frames around causes, and disagreement around 
consequences might result in a "false" unchanged overall level of consensus. 
Methods 
A framing analysis of 958 news articles retrieved from nine British newspapers between 1988 
and 2016 was conducted. The newspapers were selected in relation to their circulation and 
presence on the market throughout the period (https://www.statista.com). Given the ordinal 
nature of the variables (measured using a five-point scale), the relation between frame elements 
and the political orientation of the newspapers (dichotomous variable)/bloc of years (ordinal 
variable) was investigated through ordinal regression analyses. The choice of this model 
instead of a linear regression was motivated by the ordinal nature of the dependent variable, 
which was measured by a five-point scale. Moreover, this choice was further supported by 
performing a linear regression analysis, which, however, did not aid in interpretation. 
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The present study operationalises the following three frames: 
i) “general consensus” (five ordered categories: consensus, partial consensus, neutral, partial 
scepticism and scepticism), which relates to the overall representation of the problem (Table 
1); 
ii) “causation” (five ordered categories: anthropogenic, mostly anthropogenic, balanced, 
mostly natural and natural), which was built upon the “balance frame” developed by Boykoff 
and Boykoff (2004) to evaluate the consensus around the causes of climate change (Table 1);  
iii) “consequences” (five ordered categories: certain, mostly certain, balanced, mostly 
uncertain and uncertain), which relates to the recognition of climate change consequences 
(Table 1).  
To observe the prominence of the text that is connected to the consequences in the articles, the 
position of the first paragraph in which the consequences are discussed (as certain or uncertain) 
was identified. To determine the position of the text, the ratio between the paragraph in which 
the consequences are mentioned and the total number of paragraphs was calculated. This made 
it possible to determine if the paragraph appears either in the first or second half of the text. 
Moreover, the mention of the consequences in the title was considered.  
Around 10% of the entire sample (92 items) was independently coded by a second researcher. 
Despite the relatively small sub-sample considered, the Krippendorff alpha was calculated 
following the guidelines provided by De Swert (2012) who suggests coding ten percent of the 
complete dataset. An inter-coder reliability of .87 per general consensus, .71 per causation, and 
.85 per balance, was achieved meeting accepted criteria for inter-coder reliability (Hayes and 
Krippendorff, 2007).i  
Sample criteria  
The sample consists of 958 news articles retrieved from nine British newspapers and their 
Sunday and online versions. Both news and editorials were included to explore the extent to 
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which the articles reflect editorial lines. Hallin and Mancini (2004, p. 208) present the British 
press (2004) as a mirror of the divisions in politics. They argue that partisan orientations can 
be found in news content (see also Curtice, 1999). However, the literature highlights the 
difficulty in attributing a precise and undisputable political orientation to newspapers (Edwards 
& Cromwell, 2006). This is why the sample was split into two macro-groups and labelled as 
"centre-right" (CR) and "centre-left" (CL). The political orientation was attributed to 
newspapers by adopting the classification provided by YouGov in 2017. 
The keywords “climate change”, “global warming” or “greenhouse effect” (Carvalho, 2007) 
were used to retrieve the news articles from the Nexis/Lexis database. Only those articles 
containing keywords-related terms (“climate/climatic”, “warm/warming”, and 
“greenhouse/greenhouse effect”) in the headline were retained. Once letters and duplicates 
were removed, the remaining 9789 items were grouped into three blocs of ten years (with the 
last bloc consisting of 9 years) (see Table 3). The rationale for comparing three ten-year blocs 
related to the necessity of coding a reasonable number of articles that might still be 
representative of the entire bloc-population. The first bloc starts with the IPCC institution and 
the emergence of the climate change issue in public debate and it ends with the definition of 
the Kyoto Protocol. Therefore, both the end of the first bloc and the start of the second bloc 
correspond to an historical moment for climate change discourse due to the establishment of 
binding targets for the reduction of greenhouse gases (Carvalho, 2007). Moreover, the literature 
highlights that in 2006/2007 optimism (in terms of the potential benefits deriving from climate 
change) disappears from more conservative UK newspapers (replaced by catastrophe 
discourse) (Doulton and Brown, 2009). Finally, the Paris Conference (December 2015) is an 
historical shift in climate discourses in relation to the definition of responsibilities and binding 
and tailored targets (Kinley, 2017). 
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These shifts, documented in the literature as drivers for change in climate discourses, delineate 
the time-periods that make it possible to observe potential differences across the three blocs. 
The final sample was generated as NItems/NSample and chronologically extracted (Boykoff 
and Boykoff, 2004). This made it possible to respect the fluctuation in the number of articles 
over the entire period (the sample was larger in years with higher news coverage, see Table 3). 
The sample reflects the real disproportion between the number of articles published by CL and 
CR-leaning newspapers. 
General consensus around climate change 
The analysis aimed to understand what degree of “general consensus” (ordinal dependent 
variable) news articles tend to adopt in relation to their political orientation and their 
membership in a specific bloc of years. The negative log-log link function was considered 
appropriate, also given that the Pearson and Deviance goodness-of-fit measures of this model 
showed non-significant levels (positive skewness=2.17) (Winship and Mare, 1984). Table 4 
shows that the three blocs of years do not have a statistically significant effect on the different 
degrees of consensus. In contrast, the proportional odds model shows a positive effect for 
predictor political orientation CR (β=.979, p<.001). Therefore, holding blocs of years constant, 
the odds of a CR article to tend to scepticism rather than consensus is 2.7 times higher than CL 
articles. To answer the first RQ, related to the “general consensus” of newspapers’ narratives, 
there is no significant effect of blocs of years on potential shifts in scientific consensus. 
However, in addition to a higher probability of consensus/neutral categories than scepticism, 
the higher probability of both “partial consensus” and “partial scepticism” compared to 
“complete scepticism” indicates that there is a general scientific consensus around the causes 
or existence of the problem, but some articles either deny or are uncertain around the 
consequences of climate change or the need for intervention.  
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The distribution of the different degrees of consensus adopted by the newspapers in relation to 
their political orientation (Figure 1) shows that in both cases consensus/partial consensus 
prevails (with a dramatic gap between the two groups), but scepticism/partial scepticism is a 
peculiarity of the CR-leaning newspapers. This suggests that both groups tend to give more 
space to “consensus”. However, in the CR newspapers, almost the half of the articles either 
adopts a sceptical, partially sceptical or neutral frame to approach the problem. 
Anthropogenic causes of climate change 
To explore the effects of the political orientation of newspapers and blocs of years on the 
consensus around causes, the choice of an ordinal regression was appropriate in relation to the 
ordinal nature of the dependent variable (Winship and Mare, 1984). 
Table 5 shows that only the first bloc of years (1988-1997) has a significant effect on the 
causation frame. Holding the political orientation constant and given its estimate value 
(β=1.525), the odds for the first bloc being in a natural causation category increase by 4.6 times 
in comparison to the third bloc. In this case, the log-ordered model shows a negative, but not 
significant effect for predictor political orientation CR (β=-.429; p>.05). 
To answer RQ2, this result supports an increasing tendency to recognise the anthropogenic 
causes of the problem in the third bloc regardless of the newspapers’ political orientation. 
However, observing the distribution of the categories related to causation over the three blocs 
(Figure 2), half of the CR sample represents anthropogenic causes, and the remaining half is 
split into not considering the causes (29%), representing climate change as natural/mostly 
natural phenomenon, and balancing the natural and anthropogenic causes. In the third bloc, the 
recognition of anthropogenic causes slightly increases, supporting a growing recognition of 
human-induced climate change. In contrast, in the CL-leaning group (Figure 3) the attribution 
of climate change to natural causes represents a negligible percentage that tends to disappear 
over time. There is also a slight decrease in representing anthropogenic causes and an increase 
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in not mentioning the causes anymore. This might be explained by the fact that climate change 
has been progressively recognised as “human-induced” and there is no need to debate the 
causes anymore (Grundmann and Krishnamurthy, 2010; Nerlich et al., 2012). 
Consequences of climate change 
The analysis of the effects of political orientation and blocs of years on consensus around 
consequences shows statistically significant differences between CL and CR-leaning 
newspapers. The ordinal regression model based on negative log-log-link function appears to 
fit the data (positive skewness=2.22), given values higher than .05 for the Pearson and 
Deviance goodness-of-fit measures. Observing the distribution of consensus around 
consequences over time in relation to political orientation (Figure 4),ii an increasing adoption 
of all the categories included in this frame over time is observed for the CR newspapers. 
However, both certain and mostly certain consequences prevail over the entire period. In 
contrast, the adoption of certainty is higher for the CR-leaning newspapers with a decrease in 
the third bloc, and a slight increase in adopting uncertainty frames. Table 6 shows that the first 
bloc of years has a significant effect on the consequences frame. The odds for the first bloc 
being in a higher uncertainty category increase by five times in comparison to the third bloc, 
indicating a higher probability of uncertainty in the first period. Moreover, the model shows a 
positive effect for predictor political orientation CR (β=1.61; p<.01), indicating that, holding 
the bloc of years variable constant, the odds of a CR article to tend to uncertainty rather than 
certainty are five times higher than the odds of an article with CL orientation.  
These results indicate that even though certainty prevails across the three blocs, there is a higher 
probability of representing uncertainty in the first period, and that CR-leaning newspapers are 
more likely to represent uncertainty around consequences compared to their counterparts. 
Figure 5 shows the percentage values relative to the adoption of different categories included 
in the consequences frame by the two groups. It shows that 72% of articles belonging to CL-
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leaning newspapers refer to certain or mostly certain consequences; whereas in the case of CR-
leaning newspapers half of the sample is split between uncertain/mostly uncertain 
consequences (24%), balanced reporting (11%), or does not consider the consequences (16%). 
This result supports that conservative newspapers tend to give more space to sceptical positions 
compared to their marginal weight in the scientific debate not only in relation to the causes 
(Boykoff and Boykoff, 2004; Carvalho, 2007), but also to the consequences. However, the 
uncertainty/negation of consequences does not significantly increase across the blocs.  
Finally, observing the position of the paragraphs related to consequences in the text, the 
mention of consequences as certain appears in around the first third of the article for the CL 
(on average included in the sixth paragraph) and the first quarter of the CR (on average included 
in the tenth paragraph). However, while the CL keeps this value constant across the three blocs, 
the CR tends to move the discussion of the consequences as certain to the middle of the article 
(from the sixth paragraph on average in the first bloc towards the twelfth paragraph in the third 
bloc). In contrast, when uncertainty prevails the articles tend to shift the discussion of 
consequences in the first half of the text (from the twelfth paragraph on average in the first two 
blocs towards the eighth paragraph in the third). This suggests that across the three blocs the 
CR tends to incorporate a discussion of real consequences in the middle of the article, whereas 
it gives prominence to paragraphs related to the uncertainty of consequences in the third bloc. 
In both groups, there is a tendency to mention the consequences in the title when discussing 
the consequences in the text (55% of cases for the CL and 53% for the CR). For the CR the 
percentage of articles that include the consequences in the title if they discuss uncertainty in 
the first half of the text is slightly higher compared to discussing them in the second half (44% 
in the first and 33% in the second half). However, this is also valid when discussing certain 
consequences. In fact, 57% of the items that mention certain consequences in the first half of 
the article and 48% of the mentions in the second half also contain the consequences in the 
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title. This suggests that the titles tend to direct attention to the consequences (either certain or 
uncertain). However, the literature highlights that the prominence of the information increases 
if it is presented between the first 5 or 10 paragraphs of a story (Fico, Richardson and Edwards, 
2004). Given that in the third bloc the CR articles give more chances of visibility to uncertain 
consequences, and a shift towards the twelfth paragraph when considering certain 
consequences, this might suggest an increasing relevance given to the uncertainty of 
consequences. 
Discussion  
CR articles showed a higher tendency to adopt sceptical frames rather than consensus compared 
to their counterparts. This supports the literature relating to the existence of two contrasting 
narratives rooted in the political nature of the problem (Feldman et al., 2014; Hart and Nisbet, 
2012; Jamieson and Hardy, 2014; Hmielowski et al. 2013; Zhao, Rolfe-Redding and Kotcher, 
2016). At the same time, it also shows that the CL group is not “immune” from reporting 
scepticism. However, the distribution of the consensus frame showed a “balance” for the CR-
leaning group, given that half of the sample adopts consensus/partial consensus; and the second 
half ranges from sceptical to neutral positions. The sceptical/partially sceptical frames alone 
represent more than 30% of the sample. A plausible explanation for the use of 
uncertainty/conflicts might be connected to a potential attempt to increase “confusion” in the 
public understanding of the phenomenon. This is also supported by the “over-representation” 
of scepticism, given that sceptical opinions represent a minority in climate science (Boykoff, 
2013; Freudenburg and Muselli, 2010; Rahmstorf, 2012; Tosse, 2013). Despite an overall 
stability of “general consensus” throughout the period, the odds of an article using either 
“partial consensus” or “partial scepticism” instead of “scepticism” suggest a higher probability 
of representing both “uncertainty around” and “denial of” consequences/need for action. In 
fact, the definition of “partial consensus” included consensus around both the existence and 
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causes of the phenomenon and uncertainty around consequences or intervention; whereas 
“partial scepticism” included consensus around both the existence and causes of the 
phenomenon, and denial of consequences or intervention. This indicates that, despite a 
significant probability of the right group being more sceptical compared to the centre-left, 
consensus is prevalent. However, beyond a complete denial of the problem (a peculiarity of the 
CR), some articles specifically question climate change consequences or intervention on it. 
This result indicates a shift in questioning different aspects of climate change over time (Hiles 
and Hinnant, 2014). This is confirmed by the analysis of both causation and consequence 
frames. To answer RQ2, the decrease in attributing natural causes to climate change for the CR 
and the increase in not mentioning the causes anymore for the CL indicate an increasing 
recognition of “human-induced” climate change, and no need to debate the causes anymore 
(Grundmann and Krishnamurthy, 2010; Nerlich et al., 2012). Therefore, an evolution from 
questioning the causes of the phenomenon (first bloc) towards recognising its anthropogenic 
nature (third bloc) was observed, regardless of the political orientation of the newspapers. This 
is in line with those findings that already highlighted an increasing consensus in climate 
narratives around the existence of the phenomenon and its causes (Boykoff, 2007; Gibson, 
Craig and Harper, 2015; Grundmann and Scott, 2014; Jang and Hart, 2015). However, given 
that the overall consensus has not changed over time, the explanation should be sought in an 
evolution towards questioning other aspects (e.g. intervention), as supported by the analysis of 
the consequences frame. Accordingly, to answer RQ3, related to an increase in questioning the 
consequences of the phenomenon, the model showed no significant changes in reporting 
certainty around consequences over time. In contrast, a decrease of uncertainty/denial is 
suggested. However, as in the case of “general consensus”, the results confirm a significant 
difference between the CL and CL-leaning newspapers. In fact, the CL-leaning newspapers 
tend to represent the consequences as certain or mostly certain. In contrast, half of the CR-
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leaning articles range from uncertain/mostly uncertain consequences, balanced reporting, and 
not reporting the consequences, suggesting a polarisation and a tendency for conservative 
newspapers to give more space to sceptical positions (Boykoff and Boykoff, 2004; Carvalho, 
2007). This is further supported by a tendency of the CR in the third bloc to give visibility to 
the uncertainty around the consequences by positioning the discussion in the first half of the 
articles. Finally, interpreting these findings in light of the “general consensus”, which indicated 
a higher probability of questioning either consequences or intervention compared to the denial 
of climate change as a whole, further research around the shift of sceptical strategies towards 
questioning the need for action against climate change is needed. These results are in line with 
previous theoretical explanations provided by the literature. Accordingly, they suggest the 
complex and controversial nature of media reporting of climate change, which in turn can be 
influenced by specific political orientations (Rice et al., 2018). In fact, if the analysis was 
limited to “scepticism around causes and consequences” without distinguishing between the 
political orientations of newspapers, it would have resulted in newspapers increasingly 
adopting consensus-oriented narratives. Instead, analysis of general consensus revealed that 
sceptical strategies have evolved over time by shifting the focus towards other aspects. 
Therefore, the emergence of "impact sceptics" (Painter and Ashe, 2012; Painter and Gavin, 
2015) might have produced a shift in recognising climate change, towards questioning not only 
the entity of consequences (potentially beneficial, or by contrast, out of human control), but 
also the intervention needed. This might be also explained by the media focus on the political 
dimension of the phenomenon (Jaspal, Nerlich and van Vuuren, 2016; Ric, Boykoff and Pielke 
Jr., 2011), which relates to the strategies of intervention proposed by different political forces. 
At first glance, the lack of an increase in questioning the consequences might appear in contrast 
with the pioneering role of the UK in implementing a national climate risk assessment 
(included in the Climate Change Act, 2008), a UK National Adaptation Programme (DEFRA, 
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2013) and the establishment of the UK Climate Impacts Programme in 1997. However, the 
integration of adaptation into climate policies might support a shift towards questioning the 
political intervention rather than the consequences per se. This is further supported by an 
interest shown by UK media in adopting “action frames” when reporting on climate change 
(Grundmann and Krishnamurthy, 2010; Nerlich, Forsyth and Clarke, 2012) and, therefore, a 
politically-oriented perspective. The quantitative approach confines the analysis to a 
descriptive level. However, this limit might be overcome in future research by adopting mixed 
approaches that can show the nuances of scepticism in media reporting on climate change. 
Conclusion 
The increasing consensus around both causes and consequences over time does not mean that 
scepticism has disappeared. Analysis of the overall consensus around climate change shows 
that sceptical arguments are still present in the debate, suggesting an “inverse disproportion”. 
In fact, sceptics represent a negligible component of the scientific debate. Despite a persistence 
of contrasting narratives rooted in the political nature of the problem, this study also highlighted 
that the CL group is not “immune” from reporting scepticism. Further research might shed light 
on the potential effects produced by the penetration of scepticism even in newspapers that tend 
to support scientific consensus.  
Moreover, these findings raise questions around the representation of actions needed to limit 
climate change impact. This requires further research in terms of qualitatively analysing the 
news articles to identify how climate change consequences are represented by newspapers, and 
the related actions invoked. This represents a limit of this work that, in defining the 
“consequences frame”, assumed that the recognition/denial of consequences was associated 
with a demand/rejection of action. In fact, the certainty of consequences might not necessarily 
imply that intervention is needed, if, for example, these consequences are represented either as 
“out of human control” or beneficial. Nevertheless, CR narratives are still more oriented to 
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scepticism compared to their counterparts and despite an overall consensus around scientific 
advances. Therefore, this study suggests that scepticism concerns not so much the 
consequences per se, as the (non)intervention needed to deal with them. Accordingly, this paper 
showed that there is a need to isolate potentially different “targets” of scepticism, e.g. by 
isolating and exploring scepticism around intervention.  
Finally, in contrast to what happens in other contexts, this study suggests a prevalence of CL 
reporting on climate change in comparison to their counterparts. In fact, studies in the USA 
showed that the coverage of climate change was higher in conservative cable news. This higher 
coverage was also found to be dismissive (Feldam et al., 2012), and associated with both 
incidental mentions of the phenomenon and several unrelated stories (Ahern and Forme, 2016). 
As noted, the present study focuses on news that mentions climate change-related keywords in 
the headlines, hence, excludes those pieces that could incidentally mention the problem when 
discussing different issues. However, this potential difference between contexts and media 
deserves to be further explored by studies on media trends in climate change coverage. 
In conclusion, it should be acknowledged that this study does not make a distinction between 
news and opinion pieces, and this might influence the results, as suggested by Brüggemann 
and Engesser (2017). However, the aim of this paper was to analyse how newspapers construct 
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General consensus frame 
1. Consensus frame: general recognition of scientific consensus around causes, entity, 
consequences and need for intervention 
Example: "A survey [...] reveals a consensus that reductions of 40 per cent in carbon dioxide emissions are [...] 
feasible [...]. [This] would be the first step in bringing global warming to a halt" (Fagan, 1990). 
2. Partial consensus: recognition of scientific consensus about causes and existence, 
uncertainty about entity of consequences/types of actions to be taken 
Example: "[The report] focuses on the costs associated with keeping warming below 2 degrees C [...]. That 
number [...] may be changed or deleted altogether in Berlin" (Associated Press, 2014). 
3. Neutral frame: No specific position expressed 
Example: "The report [...] concludes that the heating [...] is between 0.3C and 0.6C, which is compatible with 
greenhouse warming models but might as easily be explained by climatic variation" (Hawkes, 1990). 
4. Partial scepticism: recognition of scientific consensus around causes or existence, negation 
of consequences, no intervention is needed 
Example: "there are only theories as to why the Earth has warmed so much slower in the past 15 years [...]. The 
models may have been wrong" (The Times, 2013). 
5. Sceptical frame: Presentation of the problem as controversial in all regards, a conflict 
between different parties 
Example: "One of the enduring myths of our time is that [...] global warming is supported by 'the world's top 
2,500 climate scientists''' (Booker, 2009).  
Causation frame 
1. Anthropogenic: anthropogenic global warming exists, clearly distinct from natural 
variations  
Example: "'There is widespread evidence of anthropogenic warming" (Connor, 2006). 
2. Mostly anthropogenic: both sides are presented, but the emphasis is on the anthropogenic 
nature of global warming, distinct from natural fluctuations  
Example: "60 per cent of methane originates from human activity, the rest coming from wetlands and other 
natural sources" (AFP & Plummer, 2016). 
3. Balanced: balanced account of both anthropogenic and natural global warming  
Example: "If a man [...] shows me a graph and says it proves that the planet is getting warmer because of the 
effects of man-made carbon emissions, I tend to believe him. [If] another man [...] says that [...] climate change 
is caused by sunspots, not CO2, then I'm swayed by him, too" (Redford, 2009). 
4. Mostly natural: both sides are presented, but the emphasis is on the natural fluctuations as 
cause of global warming  
Example: "A survey of meteorologists and geologists showed that [...] only 19 per cent thought that man-made 
causes were responsible" (Hartston, 1997). 
5. Natural: natural fluctuations as cause of global warming  
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Example: "[The] tsunamis [will] remind the world that natural disasters are [...] acts of nature that have no 
human cause" (Clark, 2005). 
Consequences frame 
1. Certainty: the consequences of climate change exist, and they will affect the “status quo” 
Example: "Without urgent and decisive action, it is going to have a damaging impact on every one of us" (Blair, 
2007). 
2. Mostly certain: uncertainty around the entity of consequences, but emphasis on their 
existence 
"the world will warm [...], there's still a level of uncertainty about how much" (Zolfagharifard, 2014). 
3. Balanced: balanced account of debates surrounding the existence/entity of the 
consequences of climate change 
Example: "the Met Office projected that as greenhouse gas emissions increase the world's temperature will be 
0.54 degrees warmer than the long-term average by 2016. Now its new experimental computer model [...], 
shows that rises will be 20 per cent less than feared" (Webb and Smith, 2013). 
4. Mostly uncertain: uncertainty around the entity of the consequences, but emphasis on the 
dubious nature of the claim that the consequences of climate change will be negative 
Example: "overall rising carbon dioxide levels could be beneficial" (Beall, 2016). 
5. Uncertainty: the consequences of climate change are not predictable/not exist 
Example: "There is no proof that global warming on an alarming scale is actually happening" (Phillips, 2006). 
Table 1. Variables included in the frames adopted to explore newspapers’ articles 
Newspaper Political alignment N Items 
Daily Mail CR  81 
Daily Mirror CL  15 
The Daily Express CR 18 
The Sun  CR 5 
The Times CR 74 
The Daily Telegraph CR 76 
The Guardian CL 411 
The Observer CL 45 
The Independent CL 233 
Table 2. Newspapers included in the study  
Years Items Sample* Items centre-right Items centre-left 
1988-1997 396 197 36 161 
1998-2007 1933 389 88 301 
2008-2016 7460 372 112 260 
Total 9789 958 236 722 
*95% confidence level and 5% margin error. The confidence levels are calculated according to the normal distribution 
Table 3. Sample of articles per bloc of years and political orientation 
Dependent Variables B Std. Error Odds Ratio 
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Consensus .611* .095 1.84 
Partial consensus 2.557* .195 12.90 
Neutral 3.622* .295 37.41 
Partial scepticism 4.605* .409 99.98 
Scepticism Ref. 
Independent Variables B Std. Error Odds Ratio 
1988-1997 -.489 .264 0.61 
1998-2007 -.006 .144 0.99 
2008-2016 Ref. 
Centre/right .979* .234 2.66 
Centre/left Ref. 
Model Fit: chi-square=117.181 (p=0.000); Goodness of Fit: Person chi-
square=22.205 (p=.074); Deviance chi-square=21.649 (p=.086); Nagelkerke= 
.184 
*p<0.001 
Table 4. Political Orientation and bloc of years effects on consensus (N article =958) 
Dependent Variables B Std. Error Odds ratio 
Anthropogenic 2.893* .293 18.0 
Mostly Anthropogenic 3.649* .346 38.4 
Balance 5.884* .795 359.2 
Mostly natural 8.177* 1.449 3558.2 
Natural Ref. 
Independent Variables B Std. Error Odds ratio 
Centre/right -.429 .901 0.7 
Centre/left Ref. 
1988-1997 1.525* .510 4.6 
1998-2007 -.717 1.052 0.5 
2008-2016 Ref. 
Model Fit: chi-square=85.042 (p=0.000); Goodness of Fit: Person chi-square=18.290 
(p=.194); Deviance chi-sqaure=19.654 (p=.141); Nagelkerke= .196 
*p<0.001 
Table 5. Political Orientation and bloc of years’ effects on causation (N=746) 
Dependent Variables B Std. Error Odds Ratio 
Certainty 2.095* .194 8.13 
Mostly certain 3.332* .289 27.99 
Balance 4.487* .437 88.85 
Mostly uncertain 5.589* .611 267.47 
Uncertain Ref. 
Independent Variables B Std. Error Odds Ratio 
1988-1997 1.633* .222 5.12 
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1998-2007 .255 .356 1.29 
2008-2016 Ref. 
Centre/right 1.610* .278 5 
Centre/left Ref. 
Model Fit: chi-square=232.308 (p=0.000); Goodness of Fit: Person chi-square=16.965 
(p=.258); Deviance chi-square=16.461 (p=.286); Nagelkerke= .303 
*p<0.001 


































Figure 1. Percentage of general consensus frames adopted to describe climate change 
Figure 2. Centre/right-leaning news articles’ distribution of causation frame over the three 
blocs of years (percentage values calculated on the total amount of frames adopted by the 

























Figure 3. Centre/left-leaning news articles’ distribution of causation frame over the three 
blocs of years (percentage values calculated on the total amount of frames adopted by the 












Figure 4. Consequences frame distribution over time 


























i Krippendorff’s alpha measured the inter-rater reliability by considering the ordinal nature of the variables. For 
the causation frame, the lower value depends on the fact that often articles do not refer to causation explicitly but 
mention either "man-made climate change" or human activities (e.g. industrial production). This point was 
discussed and clarified by the two coders. 
ii The “not present” category is not included in this figure. 
 
 
